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REFINING OR RESISTING MODERN GOVERNMENT?
THE BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT TO THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION
by
DAVID E. KYVIG*
Republican capture of majorities in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives at the November 8, 1994, election assured that the 104th
Congress would address the question of a balanced budget amendment to the
United States Constitution. Six and a half weeks before the election nearly
every Republican congressional incumbent and aspirant pledged to seek
enactment of what they called a "Contract with America" if their party gained
control of Congress. The balanced budget amendment figured prominently
in this campaign declaration.' Thus the 1994 Republican electoral victory
revived a perennial constitutional debate and demanded that anyone interested
in the Constitution and American government reexamine the history and in-
tent of this seemingly simple and straightforward, but actually subtle and
potentially transformative reform proposal. A review of the history of the
balanced budget amendment makes evident that support for the measure grew
not from desires to refine modern government but rather from fundamental
hostility to it. For two-thirds of a century the amendment's core architects and
advocates have believed that it possessed the potential to reverse evolving
federal government practice. An understanding of the history of constitu-
tional amendment and particularly of the balanced budget measure's past, or
a failure to comprehend such matters, may significantly affect the public
policy decision facing the nation.
Discontent with existing United States constitutional arrangements,
although a notable feature of current political culture, is hardly new. Such
unhappiness precipitated the replacement of the Articles of Confederation
with the 1787 Constitution. The same sentiment confronted the First Con-
gress when it convened in April 1789. Dozens of proposals to amend the new-
born Constitution came before that first session of the national legislature.
Twelve amendments, championed by James Madison, received two-thirds
endorsement. By December 1791 ten of the twelve gained the necessary rati-
fication of three-fourths of the states. The adoption of the Bill of Rights, an
* Professor of History, The University of Akron.
1. Kenneth J. Cooper, GOP Offers 'Contract' to Revive Reagan Years, WASH. POST, Sept.
28, 1994, at Al, A4.
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immediate demonstration of the workability of the new Constitution's inno-
vative amending mechanism set forth in Article V, established a pattern for
further expressions of dissatisfaction with American governmental arrange-
ments.2
Nearly every Congress subsequent to the First saw the introduction of
further constitutional amendments. During the two centuries after the ratifi-
cation of the Bill of Rights, representatives and senators offered over ten
thousand amendment resolutions. Significantly, over that span of time only
seventeen amendments gained the broad consensus of support required for
adoption. Seldom could proposals for reform satisfy the founders' belief that,
while a simple majority should be able to bind the polity temporarily through
a statute, permanent agreements about constitutional arrangements ought to
have the widest sanction of any republican act. Even when Article V action
did not occur, however, the ongoing conversation about authority to be
granted the federal government and restraints to be placed upon it revealed a
great deal about American constitutional thought and practice.3 Those inter-
ested in the political and constitutional culture of the United States would do
well to extend their focus beyond the terms of the existing Constitution and
judicial interpretation thereof so as to give thoughtful attention to efforts at
constitutional change, both failed and successful.
The past two dozen years have spawned an unusually large number of
proposals to alter the Constitution of the United States. Some of them, seek-
ing to reverse Supreme Court rulings regarding abortion,4 school prayer,5 and
2. See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991). For the best account of the adoption of
the first ten amendments, see generally ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, 1776-1791 (1955).
3. Constitutional scholars have given limited attention to the subject of amendment. See
generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (providing a stimulating
theoretical analysis); RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN AND JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA (1993);
MARY F. BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS, AND THE AMENDING
PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1986); ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONSTITUTION (1978); JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1992).
4. See generally Constitutional Amendments Relating to Abortion, 1983: Hearings on S.J.
Res. 110 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion, 1976:
Hearings on 66 Related Joint Resolutions Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Abortion, 1974:
Hearings on S.J. Res. 119 & 130 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (part 1 & part 2). See also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (Rev'd ed., 1992).
5. See Voluntary School Prayer Constitutional Amendment, 1983: Hearings on S.J. Res.
73 & 212 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
[Vol. 28:2
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flag burning,6 stirred brief but limited enthusiasm. Two, those stipulating
legal equality for women7 and federal representation for the District of Colum-
bia, 8 gained the requisite two-thirds congressional approval but not the
necessary ratification by three-fourths of the states. One, a bar on Congress
raising its own pay, first offered in 1789 by James Madison, even achieved
ratification in 1992. 9 But, with the possible exception of the Equal Rights
Amendment, no constitutional change has been more persistently advocated
or widely debated during the past twenty-four years than an amendment to
require an annually balanced federal budget.
The balanced budget amendment has shown itself to be the constitutional
equivalent of the Energizer bunny. Despite repeated defeats in Congress, it
just keeps going, and going, and going. The amendment gained little support
when introduced in Congress in the 1930s, 1950s, or 1970s. It then began
acquiring political momentum as state legislatures started calling for its adop-
tion. Finally achieving the required two-thirds approval in the United States
Senate in 1982, the amendment was thereafter quickly derailed in the House
of Representatives. Brought before the Senate anew in 1986, the amendment
once more gained majority support but this time slipped and fell short of two-
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Permit Voluntary Prayer,
1982: Hearings on S.J. Res 199 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982).
6. See Measures to Protect the American Flag, 1990: Hearings on S.J. Res 332 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Measures to Protect the Physical
Integrity of the American Flag, 1989: Hearings on S. 1338, The Biden-Roth-Cohen Flag
Protection Act of 1989, and S.J. Res. 180 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). See also Murray Dry, Flag Burning and the Constitution, SuP. CT.
REV. 1990, at 69-103.
7. See generally JANET K. BOLES, THE POLITICS OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT:
CONFLICT AND THE DECISION PROCESS (1979) (providing an excellent discussion on the ERA);
JANET J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986); DONALD G. MATTHEWS
& JANE S. DEHART, SEX, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE ERA (1990); Berry, supra
note 3.
8. The District of Columbia Representation Amendment has received relatively little
scholarly attention. Any inquiry should start with D.C. Representation in Congress, 1967:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); See also
Representation of D.C. in Congress, 1975: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Clement E. Vose, When District of Columbia Representation
Collides with the Constitutional Amendment Institution, 9 Publius 105 (1979); D.C.'s
Amendment at Two, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1980, at A14; Kent Jenkins, Jr., The Long Road to
New Columbia, WASH. POST MAG., July 4, 1993, at 19; Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., D.C. Voting
Rights: Shall We Give Up? Nonsense!, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1982, at C8; Steve Twomey,
The 51st State, WASH. POST MAG., July 4, 1993, at 11; Juan Williams, History Lessons,
WASH, POST MAG., July 4, 1993, at 14.
9. See Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Awakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497 (1992).
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thirds. In 1990 and 1992 amendment advocates brought the measure before
the House, both times failing by slim margins to obtain two-thirds endorse-
ment. Offered once more in the Senate in March 1994, the amendment
resolution lost again. Within six months, however, it resurfaced yet another
time in the Republican "Contract with America."
While often characterized as merely a device to restore some fiscal
discipline to Congress, the balanced budget amendment would, in fact,
fundamentally alter the nature of the modern United States federal govern-
ment. Examination of the history of the campaign for the amendment helps
to clarify the forces that have propelled it forward and the intended conse-
quences of its adoption. Placing arguments for the measure in historical
context rather than treating them as abstractions brings into sharp relief the
profoundly important changes that the balanced budget amendment would, by
design, impose on American constitutional government. The remarkable
fervor and persistence of balanced budget advocates become explicable when
the full dimensions of this constitutional reform crusade are perceived.
The remarkable resilience of the balanced budget amendment despite
repeated rejection reflects ongoing opposition to the governmental reforms of
the New Deal and World War II. Some amendment advocates desired to
reverse the turn toward more active national government while others wished
at least to retain pre-Keynesian practices of managing the federal budget. The
appeal of balanced budget arguments, especially in the 1980s, mirrored the
public's difficulty in understanding the complex economics of modern, post-
New Deal government. The balanced budget campaign displayed as well the
willingness of politicians to use the symbol of constitutional change to finesse
problems that at the moment seemed intractable. The history of the balanced
budget amendment, therefore, casts light on notable aspects of the nation's
evolving constitutionalism, as well as contributes insight on a measure that
remains on the nation's agenda.
The balanced budget amendment is rooted in the oldest and most funda-
mental concept of constitutionalism: constitutions are needed to define and
confine the powers of government. Much of the controversy that swirled
around the creation of the 1787 United States Constitution involved the articu-
lation and limitation of the authority of the new federal government. 0 Debate
in state ratification conventions centered on the question of the necessity,
adequacy, or excesses of federal power." Not until the adoption of the Bill
10. A host of works have illuminated this debate over the years. For recent insights, see
FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1985); RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1787-1788 (1987).
11. See generally THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE ORIGINAL
THIRTEEN IN THE FRAMING AND ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Patrick T. Conley
[Vol. 28:2
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of Rights were skeptics persuaded that the new government was satisfactorily
restrained. 2 During the next 150 years the nature of federal power was de-
bated again and again. For the most part circumstances produced narrow
interpretations of constitutional limits, in particular through a strict reading
of the Tenth Amendment. A more expansive view of federal responsibility
followed the constitutional revolution of 1937.13 Those uncomfortable with
the New Deal philosophy of government constructed under the leadership of
Franklin D. Roosevelt began to seek relief through, among other things, new
constitutional restrictions on federal taxation and spending.
The national government's greatly augmented authority in domestic and
international affairs during the New Deal and World War II caused the annual
federal budget to grow twentyfold. Federal spending increased under circum-
stances that made prompt equivalent revenue collection virtually impossible.
Indeed deficit spending and the Roosevelt administration became synony-
mous in some minds. Previous federal expenditure and debt had remained
comparatively tiny except during brief and infrequent times of war. No uni-
fied federal budget had even been developed before the 1920s. Then during
the Harding administration one was constructed in an unusual fashion, with-
out sharp distinctions being drawn between capital and operating expendi-
tures.' 4 This accounting method, a contrast to most state and local government
as well as private budgeting, called maximum attention to annual deficits and
minimum notice to the long-deferred benefits of (and perhaps appropriately
delayed billing for) some current spending. 5 Thus the extraordinary growth
in government spending during the New Deal and World War II to produce
benefits that would be reaped in the years ahead created an exaggerated
image of Rooseveltian federal budget deficits that critics would point to as
evidence of imprudence and irresponsibility.
& John P. Kaminski eds., 1988); ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE ORDEAL OF THE CONSTITUTION:
THE ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE RATIFICATION STRUGGLE OF 1787-1788 (1966) (providing
an excellent survey of the ratification debate).
12. See generally THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES: THE COLONIAL AND
REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski
eds., 1992); For the best overview, see RUTLAND, supra note 2.
13. See ACKERMAN, supra note 3 (placing the New Deal constitutional revolution in
perspective).
14. See JAMES D. SAVAGE, BALANCED BUDGETS AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1988).
15. Using the same accounting system, a homeowner would either pay for a house the year
it was built, or consider mortgage interest a huge and dangerous financial burden. In practice,
however, most American homeowners treat mortgage interest as a part of normal housing
costs and expect to spread hose payment over the years of occupancy. They regard only each
year's mortgage principal and interest payments as part of their annual household budget.
Federal tax policy acknowledges the legitimacy of this view as well as the social and economic
value of such cost-spreading practices by allowing taxpayers to make an annual deduction of
mortgage interest from adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3).
Fall/Winter 1995]
5
Kyvig: Refining or Resisting Modern Government?
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1995
AKRON LAW REVIEW
Substantial budgetary imbalance in the 1930s and 1940s resulted not
only from depression and wartime spending but from changes in economic
thinking as well. New economic beliefs downplayed traditional annual
budget balancing in favor of long term stabilization of the economy through
government fiscal manipulation. British economist John Maynard Keynes
posited that cyclical economic declines could be checked through increased
government expenditure and lower taxes, while excessive, inflationary
growth could likewise be moderated through reduced spending and higher
taxation. Keynes assumed that the ultimate governmental objective of a
balance between tax revenues and expenditures would be achieved over the
course of a natural economic cycle, not the brief, artificial calendar of a
fiscal year.' 6
However sound otherwise, Keynes' theory did not anticipate the inher-
ent political difficulties of central economic management in a democratic
republic. Maintaining an equipoise between revenues and appropriations had
been an accepted constitutional responsibility of Congress, though not an
articulated mandate, for a century and a half. Once the connection between
annual spending and taxation was loosened, however, elected officials found
it much easier to authorize expenditures and reduce taxes than to lower spend-
ing or increase levies. In Keynesian terms, additional taxes should be imposed
and government spending diminished to balance accounts when the nation' s
economy was surging, but politically this proved difficult. A balanced
federal budget either in annual terms or in longer cycles, turned out to be
virtually unreachable in the post-Keynes era, whether because of economic
sluggishness, national security apprehensions, or political distaste. As
federal deficits became endemic, a search for constitutional solutions began.
Whether of not balanced budgets are economically important, and the
debate on that issue remains unsettled, they have long carried great weight as
political symbols.1 7 Alexander Hamilton was willing to incur debt to build a
strong economy and national government, provoking his opponent Thomas
Jefferson to express an 1798 wish for a constitutional amendment to prohibit
federal borrowing. Jefferson abandoned this view after he became president
and the opportunity arose in 1803 to purchase the Louisiana Territory. For
more than a century, the only constitutional reform involving federal fiscal
authority to receive serious attention was an amendment to permit the levy-
ing of an income tax, adopted as the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.8 Not
16. See generally ROBERT LEKACHMAN, THE AGE OF KEYNES (1966).
17. See SAVAGE, supra note 14 (providing a well developed argument that discounts the
economic importance of budget balancing and finding the American concern with it both
unusual and politically symbolic).
18. See David E. Kyvig, Can the Constitution be Amended? The Battle Over Income Tax
[Vol. 28:2
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until 1936 was a budget-restraining amendment first placed before Congress.
At the height of New Deal legislative activity, Minnesota Representative
Harold Knutson, a Republican, suggested setting a peacetime per capita limit
on federal debt. Knutson's proposal stirred little enthusiasm at the time. 9
Two years later in 1938 the American Taxpayers Association offered a con-
stitutional amendment to limit federal taxes to twenty-five percent of income
and, when Congress showed no interest, encouraged states to petition for a
constitutional convention.2" The emergency of World War II soon swept aside
these calls for arbitrary limits on federal spending. Cost mattered little when
national survival was perceived to be at stake.
During the post-World War II conservative resurgence, constitutional
restraints on New Deal innovations gained popularity. Conservative
opponents of what the Roosevelt administration had done and what its succes-
sors might do in matters such as economic regulation, social reform, and race
relations looked for ways to check the power of government. The Twenty-
second Amendment, limiting a president to two terms and designed to block
accretions of power in the executive office, won adoption through the com-
bined support of Republicans and southern Democrats.2' Among other sug-
gestions for confining the federal government through constitutional amend-
ment, income tax limitation and required annual budget balancing stood out.22
The most discussed proposal, submitted in 1954 by Republican Senator Styles
Bridges of New Hampshire and Democrat Harry Byrd of Virginia, required
the President each year to present an estimate of expected revenues and a
proposed balanced budget; Congress could not adjourn for more than three
days until adopting such a budget, unless three-fourths of the members agreed
otherwise. Nebraska Republican Senator Carl Curtis, like Bridges and Byrd
a critic of federal spending on social programs, offered an amendment simi-
lar in most respects, but authorizing Congress to levy an added tax to reduce
existing debt. The Eisenhower Treasury Department, hardly a bastion of
1895-1913, PROLOGUE 181 (1989).
19. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BALANCED BUDGET: TAX LIMITATION
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, S. REP. No. 151, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1981).
20. RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION
BY NATIONAL CONVENTION 69 (1988); See also Frank E. Packard, Problems Arising From an
Attempt to Amend the Constitution by Convention Concerning the Limitation of Income Tax
Rates to 25 Percent, 31 NEB. L. REV. 407 (1952).
21. Grimes, supra note 3, at 114-15; See also Stephen W. Stathis, The Twenty-Second
Amendment: A Practical Remedy of a Partisan Maneuver?, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 61
(1990); Frederick D. Zucker, The Adoption or the Twenty-Second Amendment (1958)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Penn. State University); Paul G. Willis & George L. Willis,
The Politics of the Twenty-Second Amendment, 5 W. POL. Q. 469 (1952).
22. See Clement E. Vose, Conservatism by Amendment, 46 YALE REV. 176 (1956).
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Keynesian enthusiasm, recommended against adopting such "relatively in-
flexible" budgeting methods. 23 Neither measure achieved substantial support,
and both faded from view, although every Congress thereafter witnessed the
introduction of at least a few balanced budget amendment resolutions.24
The 1960s brought increases in federal spending for both military and
domestic social purposes together with a modest tax reduction, one of the
most popular initiatives of the Kennedy administration. Budgetary imbal-
ances grew precipitously as the Vietnam war escalated. First Lyndon Johnson
and later Richard Nixon avoided seeking tax increases to pay for the war's
rising costs, not wishing to provide their opponents leverage over the conduct
of the war. Various groups, each with its own political agenda, began show-
ing interest in constitutionally required, annually balanced budgets. Since
they tended to be lumped together as "balanced budget advocates," their dis-
similar objectives often remained obscure.
In 1969 a group of libertarians, unhappy with recent developments in
particular but philosophically opposed to government in general, formed the
National Taxpayers Union. This Washington-based body regarded govern-
ment as a hobble on individualism and taxes as the life blood of government.
The NTU's newsletter, Dollars and Sense, attacked government not merely
for liberal social programs but for everything from Defense Department waste
to corporate bailouts, rail and postal subsidies, and tax-supported municipal
trash collection. Assuming that Congress would be unwilling to levy taxes if
required to do so to fund all appealing spending programs, the Union em-
braced a balanced budget amendment as a means of shrinking the federal
government. By the late 1970s, it claimed 100,000 members."
Others of a libertarian bent soon took up the cause. In 1973 Jack Kemp,
a young Republican congressman from Buffalo, New York, proposed a con-
stitutional amendment limiting federal tax receipts and expenditures to a
percentage of the previous year's national income. 26 The measure would force
federal spending gradually to decline in proportion to the nation's overall
economy. Kemp believed that increasing the profitability of private business
was necessary to provide incentives for expansion. In his view, existing
opportunities for enrichment offered insufficient motivation for investment
that would eventually benefit the entire society. He became a vocal and
23. See Balancing of the Budget, 1956: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
24. S. REP. No. 151, supra note 19, at 18.
25. ROBERT KUTTNER, REVOLT OF THE HAVES: TAX REBELLIONS AND HARD TIMES 280-
81(1980).
26. S. REP. No. 151, supra note 19, at 19.
[Vol. 28:2
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energetic promoter of balanced and shrinking federal budgets as a means of
achieving his objectives.
Concurrently some of California Governor Ronald Reagan's libertarian-
minded advisors also took up the balanced budget cause. They, too, aimed at
restricting the government's resources in order to reduce its role in American
life. Lewis Uhler, a one-time John Birch Society member who for a time
headed Reagan's tax reduction task force, subsequently, in !975, established
the National Tax Limitation Committee. Within four years Uhler enlisted
prominent economists Milton Friedman and William Niskanen, law profes-
sor Robert Bork, and over 300,000 paid members. The NTLC advocated an
amendment that not only required a balanced budget but specifically limited
tax increases to the rate of gross national product growth or, if inflation ex-
ceeded three percent, three-fourths of such growth. The NTLC plan gained
a bipartisan cadre of congressional sponsors by the end of the decade. Under
its provisions, if inflation continued as expected, federal spending would
decline as a portion of gross national product." Martin Anderson and David
Stockman, both of whom would become influential White House advisors
during the early Reagan presidency, independently developed similar views
about constricting the federal government. Anderson by 1979 was advocat-
ing a single constitutional amendment that would limit federal spending, re-
quire a balanced budget, prohibit wage and price controls, authorize the presi-
dent to veto individual items in appropriations bills, and require a two-thirds
congressional vote to approve expenditures.28 Stockman, too, wanted to
achieve permanent structural change in government and saw budget reduction
as a promising path to his goal.2 9
Other Republicans embraced the balanced budget cause, not in a delib-
erate and systematic effort to stifle government, but primarily as a device to
insure fiscal responsibility regardless of the level of government activity.
They tended not to think of the federal budget as an economic policy statement
in which one legitimate option might be inflation and another might be shift-
ing to future beneficiaries the costs of programs whose results would not be
achieved for years to come. Instead, they regarded the federal budget as akin
to the family checkbook where failure to limit household spending to income
courted disaster in short order. This family analogy, formulated in terms of
the need to live within the bounds of current resources, ignored the reality that
large-scale borrowing, especially for home mortgages, was a central feature
of American family economies.
27. Id. at 277-86.
28. MARTIN ANDERSON, REVOLUTION 120 (1988).
29. DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: HOW THE REAGAN REVOLUTION
FAILED 51-54 (1986).
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Annual federal budget balancing, the fiscally conservative view held,
would remedy inflation and require Congress to confront the costs of new
programs. Indeed, under some circumstances, budget balancing might
reasonably compel tax increases, a notion anathema to libertarians. In 1975
Senate veteran Carl Curtis, bemoaning "the rapidly deteriorating fiscal integ-
rity of our nation" and declaring the Byrd-Bridges plan of preventing congres-
sional adjournment no longer adequate in an era of almost continuous
sessions, offered a complicated amendment proposal that mandated an imme-
diate surtax to cover estimated federal revenue shortages for the year. This
''pay as we go" amendment was hardly in keeping with the libertarian idea of
absolutely capping taxes, much less a device certain to reduce government.
Instead it reflected Curtis's simple distaste for "spendthrift politicians," the
cost of interest on the federal debt, and the current high inflation, which he
blamed largely on federal budgetary imbalances. Faced with the choice of
spending restraint or tax increases, Curtis believed Congress would normally,
though not invariably, opt for the former. Thirteen of his Senate colleagues
as well as other witnesses agreed with Curtis that only a constitutional require-
ment would give Congress the needed discipline to check its spending
habits.30
Not all who advocated a balanced budget amendment by the mid- 1970s
were libertarians eager to dismantle government or traditional conservatives
happy to dispense with one or another federal social program but primarily
concerned with overall fiscal restraint. Paul Simon of Illinois, a liberal Demo-
crat, supported the Curtis proposal as a means of insuring that Congress would
reestablish the linkage between authorizing expenditures and providing ad-
equate revenues. Although he did not say so at the hearing, Simon elsewhere
suggested that he regarded a balanced budget requirement as a device to re-
strain presidents from proposing more politically popular spending than they
were prepared to advocate funding through taxes. Greater fiscal responsibility
could reduce military spending and possibly free resources for other purposes.
At the very least, it avoided diversion of public funds into debt service.
Simon's belief in the amendment, although not widely shared by those pur-
suing similar social reform agendas, would endure. Testifying in its behalf as
a freshman Representative in 1975, he remained a principal sponsor as an
experienced Senator in the 1990s. 1
30. See Balancing the Budget, 1975: Hearings on S.J. Res. 55 & 93 Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
3-13 (1975).
31. See id. at 182-85; Helen Dewar & Guy Gugilotta, Hill Pressure to Outlaw Deficits
Builds, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1992, at AI, A14; Michael Kinsley, The Liberal Case for a
Balanced Budget Amendment, WASH. POST, May 14, 1992, at A23; Paul Simon, Why We
Need a Balanced Budget Amendment, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1993, at A30.
[Vol. 28:2
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None of the various rationales moved Congress to embrace a balanced
budget amendment in the mid-1970s. Chairman Birch Bayh allowed Senate
Constitutional Amendments Subcommittee conservatives to hold 1975
hearings on the Curtis proposal, but did not himself attend. Congressional
inaction led proponents to employ alternative amendment tactics. Urged on
by the National Taxpayers Union, the Maryland and Mississippi legislatures
in 1975 launched an effort to circumvent Congress and obtain constitutional
change through a never-used Article V procedure. The legislatures requested
a federal constitutional convention to propose a balanced budget amendment
for state ratification. Article V mandated that, if two-thirds of the states so pe-
titioned, Congress would have to provide for such a convention. The NTU
campaign went ahead quietly and quickly as legislators found convention calls
both painless and popular. By March 1978 twenty-two states had filed con-
vention petitions. In June, when California voters approved a state property
tax reduction measure known as Proposition 13, a sense of popular discontent
with increasing rates of inflation and government spending at all levels
spurred further interest in a balanced federal budget requirement in state
capitols from California to Arkansas to New Hampshire.32
Advocacy of a balanced federal budget became increasingly attractive
to politicians in the midst of the stagnant but inflationary economy of the late
1970s. It is noteworthy that specific steps to achieve a balanced budget,
whether tax increases or spending reductions, did not have equivalent popu-
larity. Public opinion surveys repeatedly showed two-thirds or more (some-
times substantially more) of Americans favoring a balanced federal budget.33
Whether or not they understood the implications of such a measure was doubt-
ful, however. One early 1979 poll probed further and found that substantial
majorities opposed reductions in every major area of federal spending.34 The
opportunity symbolically to embrace the balanced budget principle without
having to explain how one would implement it, much less immediately do so,
attracted a variety of politicians to the cause of constitutional amendment.
Most notable among them was Ronald Reagan's successor as California
governor, Jerry Brown, who decided to make the balanced budget amendment
a centerpiece of his second inaugural address in January 1979.
Endorsement of the convention petition drive by Brown, a Democrat,
albeit a frequently unconventional one, drew press attention and, in the words
32. CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 79; KUTTNER, supra note 25, at 282.
33. GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL 124-27 (1982); Id. at 81 (1979); Id. at 198-99
(1978); Associated Press - NBC Poll, Washington Star, Feb. 13, 1979; ABC News-Harris
Survey, February 8, 1979.
34. ABC News-Harris Survey, Feb. 8, 1979. A May 14-17, 1982, Gallup survey confirmed
these results. GALLUP, supra note 33 at 124-27.
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of the National Taxpayer Union's leader, "Blew our cover!"35 Congressional
Democrats began saying that a good way to start balancing the federal bud-
get would be to eliminate federal revenue sharing with the states, while their
Republican counterparts suggested that Congress submit an amendment
limiting federal spending as a means to avoid an unpredictable constitutional
convention. Citizens for the Constitution, an organization to oppose the state
petition drive, sprang quickly to life, declaring "The last President who used
the balanced budget as a fiscal remedy was Herbert Hoover," and "The same
folks who brought you the 'Great Depression' of the 1930s now want to
rewrite your Constitution." Headed by Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor
Thomas P. O'Neill, III, son of Speaker of the House "Tip" O'Neill, and sup-
ported by organized labor as well as the Carter administration, the ad hoc
coalition moved rapidly and lobbied strenuously to defeat petition resolutions
in the Montana senate and the Massachusetts house. In February 1979
California held the first state legislative hearings on the amendment and a
constitutional convention but then chose to proceed no farther. The Ohio
legislature killed the convention petition as well. Although New Hampshire
submitted the thirtieth convention request, by mid-1979 the state initiative
confronted significant resistance for the first time.36
The prospect of a constitutional convention, a phenomenon unknown
since 1787 (unless one counted an irregular gathering of state representatives
in Washington on the eve of the Civil War), generated considerable anxiety
among political leaders. While lawyers debated whether such a convention
could be confined to the subject for which it was ostensibly called, politicians
and historians easily recalled that, once in session, the 1787 body had
acknowledged no restrictions on its mandate. From President Jimmy Carter,
who proclaimed a convention "extremely dangerous" because "completely
uncontrollable," to conservative Republican Senator Barry Goldwater, who
labeled convention calls "foolhardy," a wide spectrum of national figures
denounced the state petition drive.3 7 Expressions of concern about a balanced
budget amendment itself took second place as apprehensions grew regarding
the unpredictable possibilities of a constitutional convention.
Birch Bayh's staff at the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on the Consti-
tution carefully examined the state petitions. Some proposed very strict
budget balancing requirements; others permitted exceptions under various
circumstances. Most had been formally filed with Congress, but, as it turned
35. KUTTNER, supra note 25, at 282.
36. Citizens for the Constitution brochures, Linda Rogers-Kingsbury office files, U.S. Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution (copies on file with author); CAPLAN, supra note
20 at 79-82; KUTTNER, supra note 25, at 282-89.
37. CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 81-82.
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out, at least six had not, and Indiana's had been filed by mistake, not actually
having been adopted by the state legislature. Another half dozen petitions
requested submission of a balanced budget amendment but failed to specify
that this be done by convention.38 While the review suggested that consider-
ably fewer than the reported number of petitions could pass the test of asking
for the same thing and doing so in a proper fashion, Bayh's staff did not
relax. Acknowledging the political appeal of the balanced budget idea, the
staff assembled arguments against it. They focused on the adverse effect it
would have on efforts to remedy economic recession. With the economy in
decline, federal revenues shrinking, and required outlays for unemployment
compensation and public assistance increasing, Congress would be compelled
to reduce other expenditures and perhaps raise taxes as well rather than prime
the pump of recovery. "In this situation," a staff memo concluded, "the bud-
get might end up chasing the economy down its own slide."39
Meanwhile, the Carter White House staff consulted with Harvard law
professor Laurence Tribe about dealing with a possible constitutional conven-
tion. Tribe thought the balanced budget amendment a bad idea on various
grounds but counseled the administration not to take the anti-democratic
position of resisting the right of the people to alter their Constitution. While
he provided a long list of unsettled questions about the operation of a conven-
tion, he urged emphasis instead on "the folly of engraving the policy of
fiscal austerity in the Constitution." Point to slavery and prohibition, he
advised, as the only specific policies endorsed in the Constitution, both
unwisely so. Tribe argued that if a balanced budget was desirable, it was nev-
ertheless too complex a matter to deal with in constitutional generalities.
"Needlessly amending the Constitution injures our political system at its core.
Once the amendment device had been transformed into a fuzzy substitute for
the more focused legislative process, not only would the lawmaking function
of Congress be eroded, but the Constitution itself would lose its unique sig-
nificance as the ultimate expression of fundamental and enduring national
values." To Tribe, unless the Constitution became "easier to alter than it has
ever been or should ever become, it will remain the least appropriate instru-
ment for American economic policy" with its need for "flexibility and raped
responsiveness to changing circumstances."40
38. Linda Rogers-Kingsbury to Senator Bayh, July 19, 1978, and petition files, Linda
Rogers-Kingsbury office files, U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution (copies
on file with author).
39. Balanced Budget Group to Senator Bayh, January 16, 1979, Linda Rogers-Kingsbury
office files, U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution (copies on file with
author).
40. Laurence H. Tribe to Timothy E. Kraft, Assistant to the President, Jan. 17, 1979, Linda
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Such economic and constitutional arguments failed to persuade those
who sought the balanced budget amendment precisely because it would im-
pose a particular economic policy upon the government and significantly
restrict presidential and congressional discretion. The National Taxpayers
Union kept up its petition drive, undaunted by questions about the validity
of petitions or their continued validity once the Congress to which they were
addressed had adjourned. The Supreme Court's 1939 Coleman v. Miller
ruling that the validity of a state act under Article V was a political question,
thus one for Congress, not the courts, to decide, established a legal basis for
ignoring disputed state petitions.4 However, should the Congress come to
believe that the overwhelming majority of states and constituents desired a
balanced budget amendment, it would not be likely to withstand the demand
regardless of technicalities. A similar petition drive had broken Senate resis-
tance to the Sixteenth Amendment, motivating senators to approve an
amendment on their own rather than risk a convention that might propose a
radically different measure, not to mention other reforms.4 2 The perception
of a widespread desire for amendment, even in the absence of a completed
convention application, had been sufficient to produce congressional action
in 1912 and might well suffice again.
Even though federal spending remained relatively steady throughout the
1970s, rising inflation, declining public economic confidence, and spreading
disenchantment with government by the end of the decade all added force to
the balanced budget campaign. Despite the resistance of subcommittee
liberals, Republicans and conservative Democrats on the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on the Constitution adopted a balanced budget amendment
resolution by a vote of 5 to 2 in December 1979. Three months later the full
Judiciary Committee narrowly defeated the resolution, 9 to 8, as one Repub-
lican, Charles Mathias of Maryland, joined eight Democrats in voting against
it. Disappointed Republican Senator Alan Simpson of Wyoming warned
his colleagues that the issue was far from dead. He disparaged the ability
of Congress to discipline itself on spending and said the only way to balance
the budget was "to shrivel the pie so we don't have so much pie to play
with." 43
Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign further strengthened the
balanced budget crusade. Deriding government as oversized, inefficient, and
Rogers-Kingsbury office files, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution (copies on file
with author).
41. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
42. CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 65.
43. Richard L. Lyons, Senate Panel Kills Constitutional Plan on Balanced budget, WASH.
POST, Mar. 19, 1980, at A12.
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corrupt, itself the problem rather than a problem solver, Reagan built on
resentments toward federal civil rights and social welfare reforms of the
1960s, the Vietnam war, the scandals of the Nixon administration, and the
perceived ineptitude of its successors. Reagan's call for tax cuts to free
investment capital and thereby stimulate growth, lately termed supply-side
economics, seemed at odds with his pledges to reduce inflation and increase
military spending. Yet he repeatedly offered assurances that he intended to
be a fiscally conservative president, underscoring such statements with enthu-
siastic endorsements of the balanced budget amendment. His message exuded
responsibility and rectitude: "Balancing the budget is like protecting your
virtue: all you have to do is learn to say no.''
44
In 1980 the Democratic party platform and its presidential candidate
opposed the balanced budget amendment. Such a position was consistent with
the Democrats' economic approach of the previous half century but awkward
to defend in light of a poorly performing economy and a sixty billion dollar
annual deficit. The Carter administration struggled to produce a balanced
budget for the election year but found itself unable to keep pace with the fall-
ing revenues and rising costs of a deteriorating economic climate. Ultimately
the administration proved unwilling to sacrifice other objectives in order to
achieve the illusive goal. Thus balanced budget advocates hailed the election
verdict of 1980, complex and ambiguous though the reasons for Reagan's
51 percent victory might have been, as demonstrating a public preference for
their position.
The first months of the Reagan presidency further invigorated the
balanced budget amendment campaign. Libertarian expectations of reducing
government grew apace. At the same time, the new administration and
Congress engaged in the very sort of political performance that had helped
fuel the demand for a constitutional balanced budget requirement. Together
they demonstrated the relative political ease of approving tax cuts and
spending increases and the comparative difficulty of endorsing levies to pay
the government's bills. While the new president endorsed the balanced
budget principle in his inaugural address, his first legislative requests were for
a ten percent tax cut each of the next three years and a large increase in defense
spending. Reagan's electoral victory, his confident rhetoric, and even the
sympathy generated by the attempt on his life ten weeks into his term made
a politically popular vote to reduce taxes even simpler for members of
Congress. Congress found it just as easy to support the request for a larger
military budget. 5
44. ELIZABETH DREW, PORTRAIT OF AN ELECTION: THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
113 (1981).
45. See generally HAYNES JOHNSON, SLEEPWALKING THROUGH HISTORY: AMERICA IN
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The inevitable consequences of these actions appalled Reagan's liber-
tarian-minded budget director, David Stockman. Without the difficult
additional step of reducing other government spending, the federal deficit
would skyrocket, he predicted. 46 It did. Whether Reagan blindly maintained
his long-standing single-minded determination to reduce taxes he considered
too high, unwisely embraced unsound economic advice, or deliberately
executed a libertarian plan to make federal spending on new domestic social
programs virtually impossible, his initiatives rapidly accelerated the growth
of the federal debt. Either to excuse their own 1981 fiscal decisions or check
a president from putting them in a politically difficult situation, more and
more members of Congress began finding merit in a constitutionally-
required balanced budget.
Orrin Hatch, who became chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommit-
tee on the Constitution when the Republicans acquired a Senate majority in
1981, quickly convened hearings on balanced budget proposals. With Demo-
cratic liberal Birch Bayh defeated for reelection and the more conservative
Dennis DeConcini of Arizona now the subcommittee's ranking minority
member, Hatch enjoyed a congenial forum. Rather than question state peti-
tions as Bayh and his staff had done, Hatch argued that they made prompt
congressional action imperative. He treated existing petitions as valid and
noted that in their current session one house of four more legislatures had
already adopted petitions. To avoid a constitutional convention, he urged
adoption of a "consensus" amendment that he, DeConcini, and Judiciary
chairman Storm Thurmond had fashioned. The "consensus" amendment
required Congress to balance each year's budget unless war was declared
or three-fifths of Congress approved additional expenditures. Further-
more, federal tax revenues could not increase as a portion of national income
without specific congressional authorization. Hatch presented this amend-
ment as a modest proposal "to restore accountability and honest to a decision
making process that is today characterized by illusion and legerdemain," one
that would merely reduce access to borrowing and tax increases. However,
the "consensus" amendment's restraint on tax levies positioned it much closer
to the version of budget balancing sought by libertarians eager to shrink
government than to the more neutral alternative preferred by "pay as you go"
fiscal responsibility advocates. The enthusiastic witnesses Hatch paraded
before the subcommittee, conservative economists, bankers, and attorneys
as well as spokesmen for the National Taxpayers Union and National Tax
Limitation Committee, underscored the government reduction agenda of
THE REAGAN YEARS (1991) (providing an excellent overview of the Reagan presidency).
46. See William Greider, The Education of David Stockman, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec.
1981, at 27-54; STOCKMAN, supra note 29, at 269-76.
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the amendment. 47
After his subcommittee and the Judiciary Committee approved the "con-
sensus" amendment in May 1981, Hatch justified it to the Senate as a reason-
able solution to greater pressures on Congress to authorize spending than to
provide sufficient tax revenue.48 In light of the concurrent Reagan tax cut and
spending proposals, the argument may have represented a sincere concern. It
disregarded, however, any Keynesian justification for longer budgetary
cycles. It ignored the case for temporary deficit spending to stimulate an
ailing economy and meet welfare needs that would increase precisely at the
moment that declining employment reduced income tax revenues. Nor, or
course, did it advance any argument of behalf of ongoing budget deficits.
None of the phalanx of conservative economists quoted in support of the
balanced budget-tax limitation amendment thought budgetary flexibility
worthy of mention, much less referred to it in positive terms. Instead, they
drew attention to "bracket creep," the gradual increase of tax rates as inflation
moved incomes to higher levels. This represented, critics charged, an addi-
tional tax that Congress did not have to justify imposing.4 9
Ronald Reagan's central economic message in the early 1980s was that
United States taxation and government spending were high and getting higher.
The balanced budget-tax limitation amendment campaign rested firmly on
this premise. The comparatively low taxes that Americans paid and the rela-
tively modest progressivity of U.S. tax rates as judged by the standards of
other advanced industrial nations went unnoted. So, too, did universal avail-
ability of pensions, health care, and other social services in more heavily
taxed but nevertheless thriving capitalist nations from Japan to Canada to
Germany and other western European democracies. The repeated libertarian
assertion that Americans were too heavily taxes by too big a government
became widely accepted. Similarly, the image of a burdensome United States
debt obscured the higher per capita national indebtedness of thriving Japan
and western Europe.50 Furthermore, Reagan's rhetorical skill in blaming
Congress for unbalanced budgets based upon his own tax reduction and
spending proposals underscored the prevalence of political posturing rather
than fiscal realism in the balanced budget campaign.
47. Balanced Budget: Tax Limitation Constitutional Amendment, 1981: Hearings on S.J.
Res. 9, 43 & 58 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1981) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
48. S. Rep. No. 151, supra note 19, at 3. See also Richard L. Lyons & Ward Sinclair,
Constitutional Amendment On Balanced Budget Is Reported Out, WASH. POST, May 20, 1981,
at A7; Panel Backs Balanced Budget Amendment, WASH POST, May 8, 1981, at A3.
49. S. REP. No. 151, supra note 19, at 5-8; id. at 26-33.
50. SAVAGE, supra note 14, at 2.
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Over a year passed before the "consensus" amendment came to the Sen-
ate floor. By the summer of 1982, however, Reagan's supply side economic
theories had failed to produce the predicted new tax revenues from tax cuts,
and the administration had set forth the first federal budget with a deficit in
excess of $100 billion. Both the executive branch and legislators were eager
to demonstrate before the fall elections that they were seeking remedies.
Presidential aides stressed to reporters the difficulty of campaigning for a
balanced budget amendment after submitting a prodigiously unbalanced
budget, though in fact doing so provided an easy means of symbolically
embracing principles being violated in practice. Reagan demonstrated this by
proclaiming in a White House rose garden press conference that "Americans
understand that the discipline of a balanced budget amendment is essential to
stop squandering and overtaxing," and then ignoring questions about his
apparent inconsistency.51 A week later he told 5,000 supporters at a noon rally
on the Capitol steps, an event crafted for television, that the amendment was
needed to bring "to heel a federal establishment which has taken too much
power from the states, too much liberty with the Constitution and too much
money from the people. '5 2 Presumably, this federal establishment did not
include Reagan's own administration.
Many members of Congress were ready to embrace the amendment as a
way of demonstrating that they opposed deficits. Supporting the amendment
was attractive although, or perhaps because, any need actually to balance the
budget would await ratification. Sensing that the drive for the amendment was
gathering momentum, opponents began warning that it might lead to dishonest
revenue forecasts, requirements for individual or business payment instead of
government funding for such items as universal health care, and other decep-
tive and regressive budgetary practices.53 Such arguments failed to slow the
amendment's progress in the Senate where on August 4, 1982, with every
member voting, the balanced budget amendment won approval 69 to 31."
The political pressures of the moment led some Senators who had
earlier stood in opposition to support the measure. In 1979 Democratic
majority leader Robert Byrd of West Virginia had stated unequivocally that
the amendment "would not be in the nation's best interest," while influential
Democrat William Proxmire of Wisconsin sternly warned that the nation
could be "locked into a rigid budgetary straight jacket that could plague our
51. Herbert H. Denton & William Chapman, Reagan Backs Balanced-Budget Amendment,
WASH. POST, July 13, 1982, at A3.
52. Herbert H. Denton & William Chapman, Reagan Leads Cheers For Balanced Budget,
WASH. POST, July 20, 1982, at Al & A6.
53. John M. Berry, In a Time of Big Deficits, Balanced-Budget Plan is Good Politics,
WASH. POST, July 25, 1982, at A6.
54. CONG. REC. S 19229 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1982).
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nation with years of deepening recession. 5 5 In 1982, however, both voted for
the amendment. Republican John Tower of Texas did not even wait three
years to retreat. After declaring that the measure "should not really be in the
fundamental law of this land," Tower immediately bowed to popular opinion.
He would vote to submit the amendment to the states, he said, to provide
"a referendum of the people as they are represented in their respective states
legislatures." Having thus taken political refuge in Article V, Tower then
further exposed his waffling by announcing that "if invited by any state leg-
islature in the country, I would be deeply delighted to testify against [the
amendment's] ratification. 56
The nation's governors were not impressed by the Senate's action.
Meeting a week later in Afton, Oklahoma, the National Governors' Associa-
tion discussed the amendment in a twenty-one hour closed session. Arizona
Democrat Bruce Babbitt emerged castigating it as "a sloppy piece of consti-
tutional draftsmanship," and scornfully adding, "It's beginning to look like
the constitution of a banana republic." 7 A less predictable and thus more
devastating evaluation came from Illinois Republican James Thompson.
"The way you balance the budget is you balance the budget," he said.58 "It
doesn't take a constitutional amendment. It just takes guts. 59
As the half-passed amendment resolution moved to the Democratically-
controlled House of Representatives, different concerns emerged than those
that prevailed in the Republican-dominated Senate. Not wishing to appear
fiscally irresponsible but seeking to render the amendment harmless, Demo-
crats on a judiciary subcommittee struck out the tax limitation section that
Republican Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois called "the heart of the
bill." The Democrats also shifted budget balancing responsibility from an
annual basis to a far more flexible "fixed period" and reduced the majority
required to approve an unbalanced budget from three-fifths of the body to
three-fifths present and voting. These revisions gave Democrats a measure
they could endorse during the fall election campaign without furthering the
libertarian goals of the amendment's original sponsors. At the same time, the
changes reduced Republican enthusiasm for immediate passage of the
resolution.6" Stalled for the moment, the amendment died altogether when the
55. Nicholas Kristof, Just How Would You Balance the Budget, Senator?, WASH. POST,
Aug. 8, 1982, at C5.
56. Id.
57. Dan Balz & David S. Broder, Governors Question Balanced Budget Bill, WASH. POST,
Aug. 10, 1982, at A5.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. William Chapman, Anti-Deficit Bid Comes Up Lame in House, WASH. POST, Aug. 19,
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November 1982 election increased the Democratic majority in the House by
twenty-six.
The 1982 Senate approval of the "consensus" amendment turned out to
be the high point of the congressional balanced budget campaign during the
1980s, though far from its final gasp. A rapidly deteriorating economy
increased political resistance to the economic policies of the Reagan admin-
istration, not to mention called attention to the rising costs of unemployment
relief at the very time tax revenues were declining. However, while enthusi-
asm for the balanced budget amendment slipped slightly in Congress, the state
response was more complicated. In March 1983 Missouri became the thirty-
second state to request a constitutional convention for the purpose of propos-
ing a balanced budget amendment. 61 With only two more state petitions
apparently needed to force a convention call, attention shifted from the
amendment itself to the matter of an Article V convention.
Questions arose as to whether or not a constitutional convention could
address topics beyond those for which it was called, reconsidering the entire
structure of United States government as had the 1787 Philadelphia conven-
tion and becoming, in the words of those who feared the prospect, a "runaway
convention. ' 62 Orrin Hatch championed a bill to limit the scope and life span
of state petitions and the power of any convention they might call into being.
The balanced budget controversy enabled Hatch to focus the Judiciary
Committee's attention on the convention bill by the spring of 1984.63 Hatch
opened hearings on the matter contending that Article V provided symmetri-
cal procedures for proposing amendments so that states would have "substan-
tial, although not unlimited, autonomy." He acknowledged a convention as
"a temporary and independent branch of the National Government," but then
drew a disputable conclusion. "While [a convention] is free to act within its
authority to propose amendments to the Constitution," Hatch contended, "it
is also subject to checks and balances designed to ensure that its actions are
contained within the proper and limited scope of its authority. In other words,
1982, at A9.
61. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION
ACT OF 1985, S. REP. No. 135, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1985).
62. See e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman,
82 YALE L. J. 189 (1972); Arthur E. Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment and the Article V
Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. REV. 949 (1968); Walter E. Dellinger, The Recurring
Question of the 'Limited' Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE L. J. 1623 (1979); Gerald
Gunther, The Convention Method of Amending the U.S. Constitution, 14 GA. L. REV. 1(1979);
Paul G. Kauper, The Alternative Amendment Process: Some Observations, 66 MICH. L. REV.
903 (1968); William W. Van Alstyne, Does Article V Restrict The States to Calling Unlimited
Conventions Only?, Vol. 1978, No. 6 DUKE L. J. 1295 (1979).
63. CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 76-77; S. REP. No. 135, supra note 57, at 13-15.
[Vol. 28:2
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 28 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol28/iss2/1
REFINING OR RESISTING MODERN GOVERNMENT?
as with any other institution of Government, the powers of the convention are
defined and limited powers and subject to check by other institutions of
Government. ' 64 The Utah Senator denied that the balanced budget amend-
ment prompted his efforts, but left no doubt that restricting a constitutional
convention to a single subject would undermine one of the most frequent
objections to holding one.
Apprehensions about an impending convention prompted interest in
Hatch's convention procedures proposal by, among others, Democratic Sena-
tor Patrick Leahy of Vermont. 65 He asked two constitutional scholars to
rehearse arguments over whether a constitutional convention could be limited
in the subjects it addressed or the procedures it chose. They could not agree.66
While the Judiciary Committee then unanimously recommended the conven-
tion procedures bill to the Senate, the central issue remained unresolved.
Senator Leahy, along with Senators Charles Mathias of Maryland, Joseph
Biden of Delaware, and Max Baucus of Montana, expressed concern about
having no convention procedures in place but doubted whether, once in ses-
sion, a convention could be restricted. 67 Entangled in insoluble controversy,
the bill went no farther.
In the summer of 1984 the contrasting positions of the major political
parties further confounded the balanced budget amendment and convention
questions. The Republican platform pledged the party to work for an amend-
ment, declaring "If Congress fails to act on this issue, a constitutional conven-
tion should be convened to address only this issue in order to bring deficit
spending under control." The Democratic platform decried "the artificial and
rigid Constitutional restraint of a balanced budget amendment" and the
attempt to call a constitutional convention. The mixed results of the national
elections, a Reagan presidential victory but a renewed Democratic majority
in the House of Representatives and a reduced Republican margin in the
Senate, offered no clear indication of voter preference. 68
The prospect of an unpredictable constitutional convention created ner-
vousness in some quarters. In September 1984 the Michigan senate approved
a balanced budget amendment convention petition, but the measure then died
in a house committee after a Republican legislator turned against it, saying she
"realized I don't want the Constitution tampered with." Referendums on
64. Constitutional Conventions Procedures, 1984 Hearings on S. 119 The Constitutional
Convention Implementation Act of 1981, Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984).
65. Id. at 21-22.
66. See id. at 28-54.
67. S. REP. No. 135, supra note 57, at 62-78.
68. CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 83.
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compelling legislators to petition for a convention failed to get on the 1984
ballot in California and Montana. Then a petition resolution failed after in-
tense debate in the Republican- controlled Connecticut state senate in March
1985. Further state setbacks followed.6 9 By August, a new Gallup poll reg-
istered a sharp decline in public support for the balanced budget amendment
and a rise in uncertainty, though not clear-cut opposition v. 7
Reduced enthusiasm for a balanced budget amendment became evident
when the issue again came before the United States Senate in March 1986.
During the previous year differences among balanced budget advocates had
surfaced in the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution as Chair-
man Orrin Hatch led a majority of members to endorse a version limiting
spending increases to the previous year's rate of national income growth, thus
preventing any overall expansion of government programs or services. Paul
Simon of Illinois, now a Senator, unsuccessfully fought this blanket restric-
tion, warning that it could "create real mischief. '71 Despite losing this argu-
ment within the subcommittee, Simon nevertheless continued to support the
amendment. Other Senators, however, had more doubts about this latest
libertarian-learning balanced budget amendment. Although four years earlier
the Senate had mustered more than the required two-thirds majority, on March
25 it failed to approve by a one-vote margin. 72 In part, the 1986 defeat
appeared to be due to the recent passage of ordinary legislation to limit defi-
cits. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of November
1985, commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings act, prescribed
gradual deficit reduction until achievement of a balanced federal budget in
1991. Perhaps a balanced budget could be realized without a constitutional
amendment.
Enthusiasm for a balanced budget amendment flagged further as the
Reagan administration neared its end. The bicentennial of the 1787 conven-
tion reminded Americans of the power such a body possessed. Support for
another waned. Although during the bicentennial year Ronald Reagan
vaguely endorsed a convention if necessary to obtain a balanced budget
amendment, the Montana senate refused to accept its lower house's support
69. Id. at 86.
70. In June 1983, 53 percent of respondents had heard or read about the amendment, 71
percent favored it, 21 percent opposed it, and 8 percent offered no opinion. GEORGE H.
GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL, 126 (1983). By August 1985, 57 percent knew about it, 49
percent favored, 27 percent opposed, and 24 percent remained neutral. Id. at 211-12 (1985).
Two years later the 1985 pattern persisted. Id. at 184 (1987).
71. George Lardner, Jr., Senate Subcommittee Approves Amendment for Balanced Budget,
WASH. POST, May 16, 1985, at A4.
72. 132 CONG. REC. S3324 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1986).
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for a petition.73 In May 1988 Alabama formally withdrew its petition for a
balanced budget amendment convention, ignoring White House appeals not
to do so and overriding Governor Guy Hunt's veto of the measures. A wide
spectrum of organizations, from the liberal People for the American Way to
the Daughters of the American Revolution to the John Birch Society, urged
the Alabama action, as they had the Montana senate vote. Phyllis Schlafly,
a leader of the anti-equal rights amendment movement, was among those who
thought a convention "a very bad idea," saying "We have a wonderful Con-
stitution that has lasted for 200 years, and we don't think anybody should play
games with it."' 74 The Alabama legislature had, she declared, dealt "a death
blow" to the convention movement. While NTU president James Davidson
discounted apprehensions about a convention and decried Schlafly as "the
Mad Hatter of American society," the divisions in conservative ranks did not
bode well for the amendment campaign.75
Ronald Reagan's successor, George Bush, emulated his predecessor's
advocacy of a balanced budget amendment with no greater success. Like
Reagan, Bush proposed budgets with large deficits during each year of his
presidency, renewing questions as to whether his calls for constitutional
budgetary restraints amounted to anything other than posturing to offset po-
litical images of fiscal irresponsibility. Whatever Bush's motives, the House
of Representatives twice considered and twice narrowly rejected balanced
budget amendments sponsored by conservative Democrat Charles Stenholm
of Texas. On July 17, 1990, the measure passed 279 to 150 but fell seven votes
short of the two-thirds requirement, and on June 11, 1992, it passed 280 to
153, nine short. 76 These amendment proposals slightly altered the language,
but retained the tenor of the Reagan-era libertarian measures that made it more
difficult to increase taxes than reduce spending. Congress would be required
to estimate revenues, then confine expenditures to that level unless a major-
ity of all members in each house of Congress (not just those present and
voting) agreed in a recorded vote to increase federal taxes. Only a three-fifths
majority could authorize deficit spending or increase the national debt ceil-
ing. In May 1992, Stenholm thought he had 305 votes for his measure, and
Paul Simon believed the Senate would likewise pass it. However, opposition
from Democratic leaders in both houses; outspoken criticism from a group of
economists including seven Nobel laureates; the specter of deep budget cuts;
the possibility that the judiciary would have to resolve presidential-congres-
73. CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 85-89.
74. Martha M. Hamilton, Blow to Balanced Budget Amendment: Alabama Rescinds Its
Callfor Constitutional Convention, WASH. POST, May 9, 1988, at A6.
75. Id.
76. 135 CONG. REC. H4870 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1989); CONG. REC. H4670-71.
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sional disagreements over revenue estimates, spending, or taxation; and the
doubts of wavering Representatives again thwarted the amendment.77 One
House member who initially cosponsored the resolution but ultimately turned
against it revealed the cause of his apostasy. After asking Bush how he would
balance the budget and receiving an evasive answer, frustrated South Caro-
lina Democrat Robin Tallon exclaimed, "[T]here was not the wisp of a plan
between the President and Congress to actually make the hard choices, to do
the heavy lifting, to balance the budget." A nonfunctioning symbolic amend-
ment did not appeal to Tallon, so he, along with others, abandoned it.
78
When efforts to constrain current federal spending became more deter-
mined after the 1992 election of Bill Clinton as President, at least two state
legislatures abandoned petitions to force a constitutional convention.7 9 How-
ever, perceptions of need for a balanced budget amendment did not fade
altogether. Independent presidential candidate Ross Perot had made criticism
of budgetary deficits and congressional "gridlock" centerpieces of his unex-
pectedly successful insurgent campaign in 1992. Clinton's first budget, com-
bining substantial spending cuts with modest tax increases, significantly
reduced but far from eliminated the annual deficit. Paul Simon, Stenholm's
ally in 1990 and 1992, reemerged as the chief advocate of a balanced budget
amendment and obtained a Senate vote on it in March 1994. Conservatives
from both major parties aided Simon. He also received backing from a few
professed liberal who believed that continued federal deficits in good times
as well as bad undermined the economic stimulus impact of Keynesian poli-
cies and blocked new government activities however beneficial.80
In 1994 critics of Simon's views countered that government finances
were now being dealt with more responsibly, that the economy was respond-
ing favorably, and that constitutionally requiring a balanced budget would
hamstring the government in the future. Falling revenues in a recession would
77. See Roy L. Ash, The I.O.U.S.A. Amendment, WASH. POST, June 11, 1992, at A27;
Helen Dewar, Byrd vs. Balanced-Budget Amendment; Senator Lobbies Colleagues - And
Lobbyists - To Reject Proposal, Id. at A8; Steven Mufson, As Bush Backs Amendment Cure,
Prospects for Balanced Budget Fade, WASH. POST, June 6, 1992, at A12; Eric Pianin, House
Prepares to Vote on Balanced-Budget Amendment Today, WASH. POST, June 11, 1992, at A6;
Eric Pianin, Byrd: Balanced Budget Amendment Will Fall, WASH. POST, June 3, 1992, at A4.
78. Michael Ross, Amendment Tough Choices for Lawmakers, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 1992,
at 1 (quoted in BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 3, at 183-85).
79. The two states that had repealed their calls for a constitutional convention were Michigan
and New Jersey. David S. Broder, Balanced-Budget Amendment Drive Falters; Concern Rises
in Two State Legislatures About Constitutional Convention, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1993,
at A22.
80. George F. Will, Political-Class Bloat, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1993, at A25. See Simon,
supra note 31, at A30.
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force spending reductions or tax increases precisely at the time when the re-
verse was needed to revive the economy. An amendment, they said, would
shift spending responsibilities to state governments and business. It would
also inhibit outlays for unanticipated natural disasters such as had just been
approved to compensate victims of Midwestern floods and a California earth-
quake, not to mention discourage funding of long-term projects with uncer-
tain results, cancer research for instance. New federal undertakings, such as
a national health care program, would become impossible. Worst of all, in the
eyes of some, requiring a three-fifths vote to waive the balanced budget
requirement would allow a 41 percent congressional minority to override a
59 percent majority. Rather than just restrain the budget, this amendment
would fundamentally alter basic arrangements of constitutional authority and
responsibility.8'
On March 1, 1994, the United States Senate again defeated a balanced
budget amendment, in this instance by a vote of 63 to 37.82 Although the
positive vote was the smallest in a dozen years, it demonstrated the
amendment's continued appeal. Libertarian desires to shrink federal govern-
ment, "pay as you go" fiscal conservatism, and broad-based concern with
striking a constitutional balance between the authority to spend and the less
politically appealing obligation to raise revenues all contributed to its endur-
ing popularity. The relative ease of justifying to one's constituents a vote in
favor of compelling a balanced budget, compared to the difficulty of explain-
ing a contrary vote, no doubt played a role.83
After the March 1994 vote, balanced budget amendment proponents
signaled their intention to continue their quest. On September 27 all but five
of the 157 Republican congressmen together with more than 185 candidates
to join them signed the Grand Old Party's "Contract with America." They
gathered on the west steps of the Capitol building to announce a ten-point
political agenda. Reintroduction of the balanced budget amendment would
be one of their highest legislative priorities for the next Congress if they were
victorious in the upcoming election, they pledged. 84 In the following weeks,
Republican congressional office-seekers continued to tout the "Contract with
America" despite the scorn of critics who described it as a threadbare set of
81. See Simon's Simple Pie, 70 N. YORKER 6 (Feb. 28, 1994); 120 CONG. REC. S1590-
2158 (daily eds. Feb. 22 - Mar. 1. 1994); Lloyd N. Cutler, An Unbalanced Constitution,
WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1994, at A19; Helen Dewar & Clay Chandler, Imbalanced Balanced-
Budget Hearings Offer Stark Views ofAmendments, Id. at A 18; Ruth Markus, Balanced Budget
Bill is Opposed; Scholars Warn of Mistake, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1994, at A5.
82. 120 CONG. REC. S2158 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1994).
83. Id.
84. Cooper, supra note 1.
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discredited ideas from the Reagan years. The outcome of the November 1994
balloting encouraged them to press ahead with the balanced budget amend-
ment and the other items of the "Contract."
As long as the political culture persists that has prevailed since the New
Deal, the balanced budget amendment will likely keep resurfacing. It could
conceivably win congressional approval and state ratification. The concept
has, after all, retained an appeal over the course of more than fifty years de-
spite substantive arguments against it and occasional admissions from advo-
cates such as Charles Stenholm that "they might be right."85 It continues to
attract support because it offers politicians a convenient way to demonstrate
their fiscal integrity even when they persist in approving spending in excess
of tax revenues. The symbolic value of the balanced budget amendment has
kept it alive despite the observation of opponents such as Maryland Senator
Paul Sarbanes that "Tampering with the Constitution is not way to restore a
sense of fiscal responsibility to our system. 8 6
The political effect of prolonged constitutional amendment agitation was
one of the few ramifications of the balanced budget crusade not to be noted
during the 1994 debate. However, fifteen years of constant discussion and
repeated demonstrations of support for balanced budget and tax limitation
amendments produced evident consequences. The Clinton administration, the
first administration in a quarter of a century with aspirations to expand fed-
eral government services to the American people, felt obliged to avoid any
action that might appear to increase, much less even temporarily further un-
balance, the federal budget, even if the result might ultimately benefit the
nation. In seeking to reform health care, for instance, the administration
steadfastly avoided policy options that might give the appearance of major
spending or tax increases. Many liberal Democrats argued that a "single payer
system" of government-provided universal health care funded by a general tax
would be most equitable and economical, achieving efficiencies and cost
controls by funneling health care spending through government rather than
through business or individuals. Advocates of a "single payer system"
pointed to Canada as a nearby example of high quality health care for every
citizen at significantly lower per capita cost than the United States currently
bore. The administration ignored its natural political allies, opting instead for
a complicated proposal for employer mandates that would, whatever its other
merits or flaws, require employers to fund medical coverage and keep rev-
enues and expenditures for health care outside the federal budget. Health care
85. Eric Pianin, Stenholm's Fiscal Notion Reaches Back to Roots, WASH. POST, June 6,
1992, at A14.
86. Steven Greenhouse, Congress; Risking an Amendment to Balance the Budget, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 1992, at 4:2.
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reform, enormously complicated in any event, was rendered more problem-
atic by the long shadow of constitutional debate over limiting and balancing
the federal budget.
Reviewing more than a half century of discussion over a balanced bud-
get amendment to the Constitution ought to make evident that the core of
support for the amendment has come from libertarian advocates of reduced
government. This reality tends to be obscured by the amendment's disparate
advocates with their dissimilar agendas. Doubts persist as to whether liber-
tarian expectations would be fulfilled by the addition of a balanced budget
requirement to the Constitution. Some observers, taking their cue from Carl
Curtis or Paul Simon, imagine that the amendment would encourage accep-
tance of additional tax levies to fund desired programs and services. Others,
recalling recent congressional actions, anticipate more mandates to individu-
als, private institutions, or state and local government to carry out obligations
at their own expense so that the cost would not appear in the federal budget.
Finally, the most sanguine predict that the likely result of an amendment
would also be the least traumatic: book-keeping changes to obfuscate govern-
ment spending or at least distinguish between single-year operating costs and
capital expenditures with benefits spread over a longer span. The apparent
uncertainty of a balanced budget amendment's effect on the functioning of
government makes it easy to dismiss the measure as inconsequential. Given
the amendment's history, however, such a conclusion would be unwise.
If installed in the Constitution, the balanced budget amendment would
almost certainly limit the activity of the federal government. Practically
speaking, new federal undertakings would be barred unless others, however
worthwhile, were abandoned. Core advocates of the balanced budget amend-
ment expect such an outcome. They would no doubt pursue judicial action to
prevent any application of the amendment other than one that would achieve
their goal of reducing government. The outcome of such judicial action is, of
course, uncertain, but rulings following previous amendments suggest that the
Supreme Court would feel bound to implement the new amendment fully and
effectively.8 7 Since never has an amendment sought to restrain the operation
of the federal government quite like the balanced budget amendment, it is
difficult to predict the nature or extent of restrictions that might be devised.
It is not hard, however, to imagine their being upheld by the Court as consti-
tutional.
Beyond the specific attributes of the balanced budget amendment lie
broader issues of constitutional revision. In setting a high standard of con-
gressional and state consensus in Article V for modification of the Constitu-
tion, the founders demonstrated their belief that broad agreement of opinion
87. See DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 32-35 (1979).
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ought to be required to define further the reach and limit of government au-
thority. At the same time, by departing from the requirement of unanimity for
constitutional change established by the Articles of Confederation, the
founders made clear that a few doubters should not be allowed to block the
remodeling of the structure of government. Establishing the operating rules
for government was, in the founders' eyes, the most significant decision for
a republic and ought not to be taken lightly. But if a broad consensus chose
to implement a new constitutional provision, it should then be binding on all.
If the Article V process is completed to install a balanced budget amend-
ment in the Constitution, and the courts regard it as a restriction upon federal
government activity, as they certainly must, then the amendment will no doubt
become, for better or ill, a binding constitutional obligation, reversible only
by another constitutional change. While such a reversal was once accom-
plished, when national alcohol prohibition was installed and then removed
from the Constitution, such a turnabout is extraordinarily difficult and un-
likely. Were a balanced budget amendment to be adopted, it would, in all
likelihood, remain in place, effectively confining the federal government
more than it has been for at least the last two-thirds of a century. The amend-
ment would continue to restrict the scope of federal authority, regardless of
changes in thinking regarding the proper role of the federal government in
economic management, provision of services to the people, or other matters.
Those supporting or opposing a balanced budget requirement should
never forget it is a constitution they are amending, to paraphrase John
Marshall. Striking postures regarding constitutional change may have short-
term political advantages, but ultimately the society must live with the con-
sequences of the constitutional choices it makes. In the case of the balanced
budget amendment, those consequences would amount to much more than the
imposition of discipline on the congressional budgeting process. They would
involve the rejection of modern approaches to government economic manage-
ment and provision of desired services.
The balanced budget amendment would fundamentally alter the consti-
tutional structure of the United States. It would significantly reduce the power
of the federal government to act as an agent for the American people. The
centripetal forces of individualism would gain a signal victory over the cen-
trifugal power of community. That is exactly what the amendment's main
proponents have intended since the 1930s. Anyone concerned about Ameri-
can law, government, and politics should carefully examine and consider the
history of the balanced budget amendment debate as to the wisdom of such a
profound constitutional reform. Adopting or avoiding the balanced budget
amendment is likely to be the most important constitutional choice of the
current era.
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